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FEEBLE, CIRCULAR, AND 
UNPREDICTABLE: OSHA’S FAILURE TO 
PROTECT TEMPORARY WORKERS 
César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández*
Abstract: Millions of people work in poorly paid jobs as temporary 
workers. These workers are hired by a temporary-help ªrm, but per-
form work for another company. As such, their status as “employees” of 
the company for which they actually perform work and on whose prem-
ises they generally labor is frequently challenged. This ambiguous em-
ployment status means that temporary workers fall outside the scope of 
federal workplace safety and health protections. This Note addresses the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), the nation’s principal fed-
eral legislation governing working conditions, as it pertains to tempo-
rary workers, as well as judicial interpretations that limit the safety and 
health protections OSHA extends to temporary workers. Rather than 
adhere to a formulaic interpretation of OSHA as the Supreme Court 
currently instructs, this Note urges courts to adopt Congress’s stated in-
tent in enacting OSHA—the protection of all workers. 
Outside it’s 100 degrees and inside it’s like 200. It’s real hot in there. They 
don’t have windows. When it’s 90 degrees, we’re just sweating. The sweat is 
just pouring off us. We just have fans but no ventilation. 
—Latina food packer in Chicago1
Introduction 
 Working conditions for low-skilled workers in the United States of 
America (USA)2 are not pleasant.3 Physical facilities may be decrepit, 
                                                                                                                      
* Managing Editor, Boston College Third World Law Journal (2006–2007). Le 
doy gracias a mis padres, Eufrocina Hernández García y Jesús María García, por su in-
spiración constante. In particular, I would like to thank my mother, whose daily toil as a 
temporary worker in South Texas factories spurred my interest in this issue. 
1 Rebekah Levin & Robert Ginsburg, Sweatshop Working Group, Sweatshops in 
Chicago: A Survey of Working Conditions in Low-Income and Immigrant Commu-
nities 30 (2000), available at http://www.impactresearch.org/documents/sweatshopreport. 
pdf. 
2 I will abbreviate “United States of America” as “USA” throughout this Note to recog-
nize and respect the common use of the phrase “united states” in the names of many 
American nations. 
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overcrowded, dangerous, and unhealthy.4 Hazardous electrical wiring, 
unsanitary bathrooms, blocked ªre exits, poor ventilation, and in-
sufªcient lighting are common.5 Workers are often required to work 
compulsory overtime, sometimes putting in seventy to one-hundred 
hour workweeks.6 The use of compulsory overtime contributes to 
workers’ overexertion, increased occupational illnesses, crippling 
workplace accidents, and generally poor health.7 Furthermore, manag-
ers regularly subject workers to psychological abuse.8 Workers are con-
stantly supervised, surveillance is routine, discipline is meted out arbi-
trarily, intimidation and harassment are readily utilized, and workers’ 
movements are controlled.9
 In addition to difªcult working conditions, today’s workers in the 
USA face an increasingly bifurcated labor force split between “core” 
workers and “contingent” workers.10 While “core” workers are gener-
ally understood to perform standard work—that which is perceived as 
permanent and full-time—members of the “contingent” workforce do 
not enjoy such stable employment.11 That is, contingent workers are 
employed on bases that are not perceived as long-term and full-time.12
 Within the contingent workforce operates a subset of workers gen-
erally labeled “temporary.”13 Temporary workers are hired by one com-
pany, referred to as a temporary-help ªrm, and assigned to work for 
another company, known as a “user ªrm.”14 Current laws regulating 
                                                                                                                      
3 See generally Miriam Ching Yoon Louie, Sweatshop Warriors: Immigrant Women 
Workers Take on the Global Factory (2001) (discussing the working conditions and 
labor-organizing efforts of women of color working in factories in the USA). 
4 See Shirley Lung, Exploiting the Joint Employer Doctrine: Providing a Break for Sweatshop 
Garment Workers, 34 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 291, 297 (2003). 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 See Shirley Lung, Overwork and Overtime, 39 Ind. L. Rev. 51, 56 (2005). 
8 See id. 
9 See id. 
10 Stephen F. Befort, Revisiting the Black Hole of Workplace Regulation: A Historical and 
Comparative Perspective of Contingent Work, 24 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 153, 158 (2003); 
see Clyde W. Summers, Contingent Employment in the United States, 18 Comp. Lab. L.J. 503, 
504 (1997) (noting the increased use of contingent workers in the last thirty years). 
11 Maria L. Ontiveros, A Vision of Global Capitalism that Puts Women and People of Color at 
the Center, 3 J. Small & Emerging Bus. L. 27, 29 (1999). 
12 See Befort, supra note 10, at 158. 
13 See Stephen F. Befort, Labor and Employment Law at the Millennium: A Historical Review 
and Critical Assessment, 43 B.C. L. Rev. 351, 367 (2002). 
14 See Katherine V.W. Stone, From Widgets to Digits: Employment Regulation 
for the Changing Workplace 68 (2004); George Gonos, The Contest over “Employer” Status 
in the Postwar United States: The Case of Temporary Help Firms, 31 L. & Soc’y Rev. 81, 85 
(1997). 
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workplace safety and health conditions disfavor the temporary work-
force, which is composed disproportionately of women and people of 
color.15 By unduly utilizing these groups and paying them less than 
core workers,16 the temporary workforce perpetuates long-standing 
racial, ethnic, and gender segmentation in the USA’s labor market.17
 Into this labor context of a modern workforce polarized between 
core and contingent workers18 and historically entrenched racial, eth-
nic, and gender segmentation,19 enters the Occupational Safety and 
Health Act (OSHA), the principal federal legislation governing work-
place conditions.20 At its most fundamental level, OSHA is designed 
to achieve safer and healthier workplaces.21 Technically, OSHA pro-
tections apply identically to core and contingent workers.22 However, 
contingent workers do not enjoy the same degree of “practical protec-
tion” as core workers23 because contemporary workplace legislation is 
                                                                                                                      
15 See Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, The Labor Market Transformed: Adapting Labor and Em-
ployment Law to the Rise of the Contingent Work Force, 52 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 879, 880 (1995); 
Summers, supra note 10, at 514. 
16 See Anne E. Polivka et al., Deªnition, Composition, and Economic Consequences of the Non-
standard Workforce, in Nonstandard Work: The Nature and Challenges of Changing 
Employment Arrangements 41, 47, 73 (Françoise Carré et al. eds., 2000); Dau-Schmidt, 
supra note 15, at 880. 
17 See Françoise J. Carré, Temporary and Contracted Work in the United States: Policy Issues 
and Innovative Responses 5 (Org. for Econ. Cooperation & Dev., Vol. VI Working Paper No. 
87, 1998); see also Joya Misra, Latinas and African American Women in the Labor Market: Impli-
cations for Policy, in Latinas and African American Women at Work: Race, Gender, and 
Economic Inequality 408, 413 (Irene Browne ed., 1999) (noting that analyses of gender 
segregation illustrate that women have been concentrated in low-paying occupations and 
that women of color are often concentrated in low-paying occupations and particular jobs 
within those occupations); Barbara F. Reskin, Occupational Segregation by Race and Ethnicity 
Among Women Workers, in Latinas and African American Women at Work, supra, at 183–
84 (stating that occupational segregation by sex contributes to sex-based differences in 
working conditions, and that ethnicity is an important basis of workplace inequality). 
18 See Befort, supra note 10, at 158. 
19 See Carré, supra note 17, at 5; see also Barbara F. Reskin, Segregating Workers: Occupa-
tional Differences by Race, Ethnicity, and Sex, in Industrial Relations Research Associa-
tion Series: Proceedings of the Forty-Sixth Annual Meeting 247, 254 (Paula B. Voos 
ed., 1994) (ªnding that workers’ race, ethnicity, and sex affect their access to occupa-
tions). 
20 See generally Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 651–
678 (2000). 
21 See 29 C.F.R. § 1977.1(a) (2005). 
22 See Katherine M. Forster, Note, Strategic Reform of Contingent Work, 74 S. Cal. L. Rev. 
541, 557 (2001). 
23 See Anthony P. Carnevale et al., Contingent Workers and Employment Law, in Contingent 
Work: American Employment Relations in Transition 221, 281 (Kathleen Barker & 
Kathleen Christensen eds., 1998); Forster, supra note 22, at 557. 
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a regulatory patchwork “riddled with loopholes”24 that often results in 
illusory protection for contingent, especially temporary, workers.25 Sim-
ply, contemporary labor law “does not play fair with [contingent and 
temporary] workers.”26
 The origins of modern-labor legislation hint at an asymmetrical 
employment paradigm between employers and workers.27 Modern-
labor legislation was developed to protect workers from the harsh ef-
fects of the at-will employment doctrine.28 Originally developed by 
state courts in the 1880s,29 the at-will doctrine allows an employee to 
leave a job at any time.30 While the at-will doctrine’s ºexibility seem-
ingly empowers workers to become full participants in the market for 
labor, this ºexibility also enables employers to ªre a worker for a good 
reason, a bad reason, or no reason at all.31 In short, the at-will doc-
trine limits job security and presumes equal bargaining power for 
employers and workers.32 Low-skilled workers, however, receive only 
the job insecurity promised by the at-will doctrine, while shouldering 
the burden of functioning in the labor market equipped with less 
bargaining power than employers.33 In particular, the at-will doctrine 
gives employers disproportionate bargaining power to dictate the 
terms of the employment contract.34
 This Note explores the practical protections that OSHA provides 
temporary workers. The Introduction addressed the current employ-
ment landscape in which temporary workers labor. Part I examines the 
                                                                                                                      
24 Befort, supra note 13, at 352; Lung, supra note 4, at 294. 
25 See Lung, supra note 4, at 294. 
26 Befort, supra note 13, at 352. 
27 See Stone, supra note 14, at 24; Jennifer Middleton, Contingent Workers in a Changing 
Economy: Endure, Adapt, or Organize?, 22 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 557, 560–61 (1996); 
Summers, supra note 10, at 519. 
28 See Kathleen C. McGowan, Note, Unequal Opportunity in At-Will Employment: The Search 
for a Remedy, 72 St. John’s L. Rev. 141, 170–83 (1998) (discussing state legislation enacted 
to address the “harshness of employment at-will” and proposing similar federal legisla-
tion); see also Deborah A. Ballam, Employment-at-Will: The Impending Death of a Doctrine, 37 
Am. Bus. L.J. 653, 655 (2000) (noting that the at-will doctrine is limited by many state and 
federal statutes, especially employment discrimination laws); cf. Stone, supra note 14, at 49 
(identifying the demise of internal labor markets—self-regulating expectations held by 
employers and employees—in the late twentieth century as sparking public concern with 
the at-will doctrine). 
29 Stone, supra note 14, at 24. 
30 Middleton, supra note 27, at 560. 
31 See Stone, supra note 14, at 133. 
32 See Middleton, supra note 27, at 560. 
33 See Summers, supra note 10, at 519. 
34 Id. 
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development and contemporary construction of the temporary work-
force. Special emphasis is placed on the unique employment relation-
ship developed by the temporary-help industry (THI) in the 1970s and 
the demographics of the modern, temporary workforce. Part II dis-
cusses the limited protections that OSHA currently provides temporary 
workers. This section presents the judicial tests used to determine em-
ployment status and the implications of those tests for temporary work-
ers. Lastly, Part III critically examines various administrative and judicial 
opinions that apply the dominant employment-status tests to interpret 
what constitutes an “employer” and “employee.” This section proposes 
methods for improving the workplace safety and health protections 
temporary workers receive under OSHA. In particular, this Note con-
cludes by urging the adoption of a purposive interpretation of OSHA 
to ensure that Congress’s intended goal, to actually protect workers, is 
realized in regard to temporary workers. 
I. From Core to Temporary: The Nature and Growth of the THI 
A. Identifying Temporary Workers 
 Understanding temporary workers necessarily begins with an un-
derstanding of the contingent workforce.35 However, no unanimity ex-
ists regarding who or what constitutes the contingent workforce.36 
Some scholars propose a deªnition of contingent work that places pri-
mary emphasis on the existence or lack of job security, entailing a close 
                                                                                                                      
35 See Stone, supra note 14, at 72. No consensus exists that this segment of the labor 
pool should even be labeled “contingent.” See id. Indeed, the phrase “precarious employ-
ment” has been offered as a replacement to “contingent.” Id. Precarious employment is 
work that lacks an explicit or implicit promise of continuity. Id. Essentially, precarious em-
ployment is the opposite of long-term employment. Id. The precarious employment rubric 
includes temporary workers as well as people who have steady, full-time employment but 
lack a “reasonable expectation of job security.” Id. at 73. In spite of the disagreement about 
the use of “contingent” versus “precarious,” the term “contingent” is much more com-
monly found in the literature. But cf. id. at 72 (offering “precarious” as a substitute for “con-
tingent”). See generally Contingent Work, supra note 23; Dau-Schmidt, supra note 15; Sum-
mers, supra note 10. Therefore, the use here of “contingent” facilitates locating this Note 
within other analyses of this segment of the labor force. 
36 See Richard S. Belous, The Rise of the Contingent Work Force: The Key Challenges and Op-
portunities, 52 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 863, 864 (1995). Attempts to deªne this “amorphous” 
group have often been abandoned. See Befort, supra note 10, at 158; see also Richard R. 
Carlson, Variations on a Theme of Employment: Labor Law Regulation of Alternative Worker Rela-
tions, 37 S. Tex. L. Rev. 661, 663 (1996) (“[T]here are few things as resistant to useful gen-
eralizations as the contingent workforce.”). 
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analysis of whether the job is expected to continue.37 Others are pro-
ponents of a deªnition that contrasts contingent work with the perma-
nent, full-time nature of core employment.38 Yet others propose a 
deªnition that contrasts workers and employers by emphasizing “de-
mocratic deªcits” as the primary difference between employers and 
contingent workers.39 Since employers “always retain a position of 
power over their employees,” contingent workers perpetually suffer a 
democratic deªcit in the employment relationship.40
 Statistical analyses of the contingent workforce have included an 
array of workers and widely varying approximations of the size of the 
contingent workforce.41 Using data from 1995, at least three estimates 
of the contingent workforce were made using three different deªni-
tions of contingent work.42 The narrow estimate included only wage 
and salary workers who had their jobs for one year or less and ex-
pected the job to last for an additional year or less.43 This estimate 
indicated that 2.2%, or 2.7 million, of the total people employed in 
the USA were contingent workers.44 The middle estimate expanded 
on the narrow estimate by adding the self-employed and independent 
contractors who had been in their employment arrangement for less 
than or up to one year and expected to be there for another year or 
less.45 This estimate postured that 2.8% of the people employed in the 
USA were members of the contingent workforce.46 The broad esti-
mate notably eliminated the one-year limitation and included self-
employed workers and all wage and salary workers who did not expect 
their jobs to continue indeªnitely.47 Not surprisingly, the third esti-
mate suggested that a much larger percentage of the total employed 
in the country were contingent workers—4.9%, or six million peo-
                                                                                                                      
37 See Sharon R. Cohany et al., Counting the Workers: Results of a First Survey, in Contin-
gent Work, supra note 23, at 41. 
38 See Ontiveros, supra note 11, at 29. See generally Befort, supra note 10, at 158 (describ-
ing the term “contingent workforce” as a “catch-phrase” that embraces “a diverse group of 
non-core workers who provide work other than on a long-term, full-time basis”). 
39 See Guy Davidov, The Three Axes of Employment Relationships: A Characterization of Work-
ers in Need of Protection, 52 U. Toronto L.J. 357, 381 (2002). 
40 See id. 
41 See Cohany et al., supra note 37, at 46 tbl.2.1. 
42 See id. 
43 See id. at 43. 
44 See id. at 45, 46 tbl.2.1. 
45 See id. at 44. 
46 See Cohany et al., supra note 37, at 46 tbl.2.1. 
47 See id. 
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ple.48 While these three groupings presented widely divergent esti-
mates, the contingent workforce generally includes workers catego-
rized as temporary workers,49 independent contractors,50 contracted 
workers,51 leased employees,52 and part-time employees.53
 As a subcategory of the contingent workforce, temporary work is 
also ambiguously deªned.54 Indeed, the only deªnitional agreement 
that exists with respect to temporary work is that temporary workers 
are non-permanent workers.55
 In devising a deªnition of temporary work, the importance of the 
work’s actual duration remains contested.56 Given the lay deªnition of 
“temporary,” temporary work “generally is understood to be either for 
a short ªxed term or to continue only from day to day, week to week, or 
                                                                                                                      
48 See id. at 45, 46 tbl.2.1. Using an identical deªnition, another analysis estimated that, 
in 1999, 4.3% of the total workers employed in the USA were contingent workers. See Dale 
Berman & Lonnie Golden, Nonstandard and Contingent Employment: Contrasts by Job Type, 
Industry, and Occupation, in Nonstandard Work, supra note 16, at 167, 174; Cohany et al., 
supra note 37, at 46 tbl.2.1. The decline between 1995 and 1999 in the proportion of total 
employment that was contingent was a result of the slowing growth of economic expan-
sion. Berman & Golden, supra, at 174. 
49 See Befort, supra note 13, at 367. Temporary workers are deªned as non-permanent 
employees. Piano v. Ameritech/SBC, No. 02 C 3237, 2003 WL 260337, at *3 n.1 (N.D. Ill. 
2003). Temporary jobs lack continuity and are intended to exist for only a relatively short 
period. See Befort, supra note 10, at 158; Summers, supra note 10, at 505. 
50 See Befort, supra note 13, at 367. Independent contractors are self-employed and 
provide companies with specialized services on a contract basis. See id. at 367 n.108. 
51 See id. at 367. Contracted work occurs when a company uses workers employed by 
another company to perform services that its own employees used to perform. See Jona-
than P. Hiatt & Lynn Rhinehart, The Growing Contingent Work Force: A Challenge for the Future, 
10 Lab. Law. 143, 146 (1994). Examples of contract work include maintenance and 
housekeeping services. Id. 
52 See Befort, supra note 13, at 367; Befort, supra note 10, at 158. Leased employees are 
workers who are selected by the company that intends to use the labor, then hired by a 
leasing agency, and leased to the company that intends to use their labor. See Summers, 
supra note 10, at 514. Leased workers are meant to be long-term or permanent workers 
rather than temporary. See id. In addition, leased workers are most often used for profes-
sional- and management-level work. See id. 
53 See Befort, supra note 13, at 367. Part-time jobs are those that provide substantially 
less than the customary workweek. Summers, supra note 10, at 505. 
54 See infra notes 55–61 and accompanying text. 
55 See Piano v. Ameritech/SBC, No. 02 C 3237, 2003 WL 260337, at *3 n.1 (N.D. Ill. 
2003). While the non-permanent nature of temporary work includes people who work 
directly for companies as their legal employees (i.e., direct-hire temporaries) on a tempo-
rary basis, this Note is limited to a discussion of those individuals who are hired through 
temporary-help ªrms. See Polivka et al., supra note 16, at 42–43; Forster, supra note 22, at 
545 n.20. 
56 See, e.g., Gonos, supra note 14, at 84–85; Summers, supra note 10, at 509. 
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month to month.”57 In practice, however, one company may hire work-
ers and assign them to work for another company for months or even 
years.58 As such, the signiªer “temporary” is a misnomer because the 
limited duration of temporary work assignments has never been the 
deªning characteristic of this type of work.59 In addition, the at-will 
doctrine also calls into question the use of job duration as a deªnitional 
aspect of temporary work.60 Since most jobs can be terminated at any 
time without notice and without severance pay, the at-will doctrine ren-
ders almost all employment “legally temporary.”61 Perhaps as a result of 
these challenges to the importance of job duration, the Occupational 
Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC), the agency charged 
with adjudicating allegations of OSHA violations, also places little em-
phasis on duration when determining whether an employment rela-
tionship exists.62
B. The THI’s Triangular Employment Framework 
 While the speciªc boundaries of the type of work that falls within 
the temporary work category remain nebulous, a common understand-
ing does exist regarding the THI’s organizational structure.63 The THI 
operates in a triangular employment framework formed by the worker, 
the temporary-help ªrm (THF), and the user ªrm.64 The THF recruits 
workers,65 pays them directly,66 and is responsible for paying payroll 
taxes,67 including social security and unemployment insurance.68 Gen-
                                                                                                                      
57 See Summers, supra note 10, at 509. Webster’s Dictionary deªnes “temporary” as “last-
ing, existing, serving, or effective for a time only.” Webster’s Encyclopedic Unabridged 
Dictionary of the English Language 1462 (1996). It adds, “Temporary implies an ar-
rangement established with no thought of continuance but with the idea of being changed 
soon.” Id. 
58 See Stone, supra note 14, at 68. 
59 See Gonos, supra note 14, at 84–85. 
60 See Stone, supra note 14, at 133; Summers, supra note 10, at 509. 
61 See Summers, supra note 10, at 509. 
62 See Sec’y of Labor v. Froedtert Mem’l Lutheran Hosp. (Froedtert II ), No. 97–1839, 
2004 WL 2308763, at *8 (O.S.H.R.C. Jan. 15, 2004); see also 29 U.S.C. § 661 (2000) (de-
scribing the function of the OSHRC). 
63 See Stone, supra note 14, at 68; Carlson, supra note 36, at 688; Cohany et al., supra 
note 37, at 63; Gonos, supra note 14, at 85; Summers, supra note 10, at 511. 
64 Gonos, supra note 14, at 85. 
65 See Cohany et al., supra note 37, at 63. 
66 See Stone, supra note 14, at 68; Carlson, supra note 36, at 688; Cohany et al., supra 
note 37, at 63. 
67 Summers, supra note 10, at 511. 
68 Cohany et al., supra note 37, at 63. 
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erally, the THF does not provide workers with materials or tools.69 Le-
gally, the THF is the workers’ employer.70 Consequently, the THFs “as-
sume, ostensibly at least, responsibility for formal compliance with the 
key legal requirements connected with this [employer] role.”71
 After recruiting workers, the THF assigns them to a user ªrm,72 an 
organization that contracts with the THF to receive workers.73 In return 
for workers, the user ªrm pays a fee to the THF.74 At the worksite, the 
user ªrm supervises the day-to-day performance of temporary work-
ers.75 Usually, the user ªrm exercises direct control of temporary work-
ers working on their premises.76 Temporary workers are not technically 
employed until they begin work on the user ªrm’s premises.77
 The triangular employment framework gives new meaning to the 
employment relationship as it pertains to the legal standards govern-
ing workplace conditions.78 In the THI employment model, the work 
performed becomes the service, the THF becomes the employer, the 
user ªrm’s purchase of the service transforms the user ªrm into the 
customer, and the worker’s use of the THF renders workers into con-
sumers.79 More importantly, given the legal and ªnancial obligations 
imposed by employer status, the formal designation of THFs as legal 
employer to temporary workers creates the THI’s primary reason to 
exist—allowing the user ªrm to enjoy the beneªts of labor while 
avoiding many of the legal obligations attached to employer status.80
C. Evolution of the THI 
 Between the 1940s and the 1970s, the THI transformed itself into a 
major component of the USA’s labor market.81 The THI was born in 
                                                                                                                      
69 See Gonos, supra note 14, at 88. 
70 See Stone, supra note 14, at 68; Gonos, supra note 14, at 85. 
71 Gonos, supra note 14, at 85. 
72 See id. 
73 See Stone, supra note 14, at 68. 
74 See Carlson, supra note 36, at 688; Summers, supra note 10, at 511; see also Katherine 
Van Wezel Stone et al., Employment Protection for Atypical Workers: Proceedings of the 2006 An-
nual Meeting, Association of American Law Schools Section on Labor Relations and Employment 
Law, 10 Emp. Rts. & Emp. Pol’y J. 233, 238 (2006) (noting that the fee paid by user ªrms 
is enough to cover wages, overhead costs, including employment taxes, and proªts). 
75 See Stone, supra note 14, at 209; Carlson, supra note 36, at 688. 
76 See Gonos, supra note 14, at 88. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 104–05. 
79 Id. at 105. 
80 See id. at 90, 103, 85–86. 
81 See infra notes 82–91 and accompanying text. 
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the manufacturing-centered economy of the late 1940s.82 After World 
War II, the USA’s economy gradually shifted from manufacturing-
centered to service-centered while experiencing “heightened interna-
tional competition, greater ºuctuations in demand, increased costs of 
fringe beneªts, a decline in unionization, and shifts in labor force 
composition.”83 Until the mid-1970s, the prevailing employment para-
digm consisted of full-time and continuous work unless otherwise 
stated.84 This employment arrangement would end only if the em-
ployee failed to perform satisfactorily or was no longer needed by the 
employer.85
 Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the THI quietly but consis-
tently lobbied legislators to alter the dominant employment practice 
of hiring workers full-time and continuously.86 In the midst of the 
country’s transition from a manufacturing-based economy to one de-
pendent upon service industries, the THI’s lobbying resulted in ex-
plosive growth for the industry.87 In the late 1960s, THFs successfully 
persuaded Congress and state governments to deem THFs a worker’s 
employer for purposes of complying with labor and employment 
laws.88 Since many federal regulations governing workplace standards 
apply only to workers who have been formally labeled “employees,” 
formal recognition of THFs as employers shifted the cost of comply-
ing with those regulations onto the THF.89 Partly as a result of THI 
lobbying,90 by the 1970s the stage was set for THFs to become a “per-
manent ªxture” in many workplaces.91
                                                                                                                      
82 Dau-Schmidt, supra note 15, at 879; Gonos, supra note 14, at 90. 
83 See Cohany et al., supra note 37, at 62; Dau-Schmidt, supra note 15, at 879. 
84 See Summers, supra note 10, at 503. 
85 See id. 
86 See Cohany et al., supra note 37, at 62; Summers, supra note 10, at 504. 
87 See Cohany et al., supra note 37, at 62. 
88 See Stone, supra note 14, at 68. See generally Gonos, supra note 14, at 93–94 (stating 
that by 1971 all but two states adopted legislation sought by the THI, including twelve 
states that explicitly exempted THFs from regulation). 
89 See Befort, supra note 10, at 417; Gonos, supra note 14, at 85. 
90 See Gonos, supra note 14, at 90. 
91 See Cohany et al., supra note 37, at 62; see also Marcello Estevão & Saul Lach, The Evo-
lution of the Demand for Temporary Help Supply Employment in the United States, in Nonstan-
dard Work, supra note 16, at 123, 140 (conªrming that the increased use of temporary 
workers was due to a change in the hiring practices of private companies such that THFs 
were incorporated into sectors of the labor market where THFs were not previously pre-
sent). 
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 In the last quarter-century, the number of workers hired by THFs 
has ballooned.92 In 1980, there were 400,000 temporary workers.93 
Eight years later this number had more than doubled, reaching 1.1 mil-
lion.94 By 1993, there were approximately 1.6 million workers hired by 
THFs.95 In that year, Manpower, Inc., the nation’s largest THF, alone 
was credited with employing over 500,000 temporary workers.96 Most 
recently, in 2001, there were approximately 2 million people working 
for THFs.97
D. Beneªts of Temporary Work for Employers and Workers 
 The growing reliance on temporary workers in the contemporary 
labor market results largely from employers’ desire to avoid workplace 
regulations.98 Most importantly, user ªrms beneªt from the legal 
characterization of THFs as the temporary workers’ employer because 
that characterization allows user ªrms to avoid expensive legal obliga-
tions imposed upon employers by labor laws.99 Firms perceive tempo-
rary workers to be less expensive than core workers100 because the 
former do not receive unemployment insurance101 or workers’ com-
                                                                                                                      
92 Belous, supra note 36, at 865 tbl.1. In this period, there has been a corresponding 
increase in the contingent workforce. See Befort, supra note 10, at 158; Summers, supra 
note 10, at 504. 
93 Belous, supra note 36, at 865 tbl.1. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 See Summers, supra note 10, at 511. Indeed, the next year Fortune Magazine declared 
Manpower the USA’s largest private employer. Jaclyn Fierman, The Contingency Work Force, 
Fortune Mag., Jan. 24, 1994, at 31. 
97 Stone, supra note 14, at 67. Today, three companies—Manpower, Kelly Services, and 
Olsten—dominate the temporary work landscape. See Cohany et al., supra note 37, at 62. 
98 See Befort, supra note 13, at 361, 416. 
99 See Stone, supra note 14, at 69; see also Befort, supra note 13, at 369 (arguing that the 
lack of regulatory protection has allowed many ªrms to “consciously” become adept at 
manipulating the factors used to determine whether a worker is an employee in order to 
avoid the legal requirements imposed by employee status); Gonos, supra note 14, at 86 
(noting that it is “widely recognized” that employers in the USA use temporary workers 
precisely to evade legal obligations because the ªnancial beneªts are “considerable”). 
100 Cf. Polivka et al., supra note 16, at 83 (positing that the lower probability of contin-
gent workers receiving health insurance “suggests that employers may be using these ar-
rangements to reduce costs”). But see Shulamit Kahn, The Bottom-Line Impact of Nonstandard 
Jobs on Companies’ Proªtability and Productivity, in Nonstandard Work, supra note 16, at 
235, 241 (revealing that company ofªcers disagree about the extent of cost savings result-
ing from the use of THFs); Stanley D. Nollen & Helen Axel, Beneªts & Costs to Employers, in 
Contingent Work, supra note 23, at 126, 136 (challenging the actual cost savings of con-
tingent workers by taking into account training costs, turnover rates, performance and 
productivity levels, and costs of unavoidable legal obligations). 
101 See Befort, supra note 13, at 369. 
204 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 27:193 
pensation insurance,102 are paid less than core workers,103 and are not 
covered by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), the nation’s 
principal collective bargaining legislation.104
 In addition, reliance on temporary workers enables user ªrms to 
ºexibly manage personnel.105 THFs are capable of providing workers 
“on demand,”106 to allow user ªrms to get workers on short notice107 
to meet their temporary-labor needs.108 As a result, user ªrms avoid 
paying for more workers than they need at any given moment.109
 To some extent, temporary workers also beneªt from temporary 
work status.110 Temporary work arrangements provide ºexibility for 
people who do not want a steady or long-term job.111 In addition, tem-
porary work serves as a stopgap measure for the unemployed by provid-
ing them with at least some income between jobs.112 In fact, temporary 
work can be a bridge to a new job.113 Lastly, temporary work can pro-
vide on-the-job training to workers.114
                                                                                                                      
102 See id. 
103 See Belous, supra note 36, at 873; Summers, supra note 10, at 512; Maria O’Brien 
Hylton, The Case Against Regulating the Market for Contingent Employment, 52 Wash. & Lee L. 
Rev. 849, 858 (1995). 
104 See Befort, supra note 13, at 370. See generally National Labor Relations Act (Wagner 
Act), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2000). 
105 Hylton, supra note 103, at 858. User ªrms engage in signiªcant management activi-
ties including determining the wages earned by workers. See Stone et al., supra note 74, at 
241. According to Stone, user ªrms and THFs jointly decide how much money workers 
earn. See id. 
106 See Summers, supra note 10, at 511. 
107 See Cohany et al., supra note 37, at 63. While the speed at which a THF provides 
workers depends on the user ªrm’s needs, the industry’s presumption is that a THF can 
provide workers at a moment’s notice to ensure maximum productivity. See Patricia 
Schroeder, Does the Growth in the Contingent Work Force Demand a Change in Federal Policy?, 52 
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 731, 731 (1995). 
108 See Carlson, supra note 36, at 688. The temporary nature of temporary work is ques-
tionable since the duration of temporary work is often measured in months or years. See 
Stone, supra note 14, at 68. 
109 See Cohany et al., supra note 37, at 63; Summers, supra note 10, at 511; see also Fran-
ces Raday, The Insider-Outsider Politics of Labor-Only Contracting, 20 Comp. Lab. L. & Pol’y J. 
413, 417 (1999) (stating that THI employment allows user ªrms to quickly terminate 
workers “at any time without actually having to dismiss them and hence can avoid the vari-
ous limitations on the right to dismiss” and the costs associated with dismissal). 
110 See infra notes 111–14 and accompanying text. 
111 See Cohany et al., supra note 37, at 63; Summers, supra note 10, at 512. 
112 See Cohany et al., supra note 37, at 63; Summers, supra note 10, at 512. 
113 See Summers, supra note 10, at 512. 
114 See Cohany et al., supra note 37, at 63; Summers, supra note 10, at 512. 
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E. Consequences of Temporary Work 
 The beneªts of temporary work are in direct correlation with cor-
responding disadvantages to temporary workers.115 Workplace- safety 
protections are eroded in the drive to cut costs.116 In addition, tempo-
rary-work arrangements unfairly place immense risk and economic un-
certainty on workers insofar as these arrangements fail to acknowledge 
that temporary workers are in need of such services as health insur-
ance, paid vacation, family leave, pensions, job security, training oppor-
tunities, and promotional opportunities.117 Furthermore, temporary 
workers labor within an asymmetrical control paradigm.118 The triangu-
lar employment framework falsely suggests that temporary workers par-
ticipate in the labor market on equal footing with THFs and user 
ªrms.119 Where the worker’s only “power” is to refuse or leave an un-
pleasant work assignment, it is “a one-sided, small-numbers bargaining 
problem: where one side has no alternatives, the other side will be able 
to set the terms of the agreement.”120
 Temporary employment is often reserved for low-skilled work that 
is poorly remunerated, exacerbating the democracy deªcit that charac-
terizes the employer-worker paradigm.121 The prevalence of low-skilled 
laborers within the temporary workforce leads to an asymmetrical 
power dynamic between temporary workers and ªrms.122 This asymme-
try leads to the job instability that plagues most temporary workers.123 
Temporary workers are more likely than non-temporary workers to be-
come unemployed, involuntarily drop out of the labor force, or have to 
switch from one employer to another due to job instability.124 In addi-
tion, temporary workers lack control of the number of hours they 
work.125
                                                                                                                      
115 See discussion infra Part I.E. 
116 Summers, supra note 10, at 512. 
117 See Belous, supra note 36, at 875; Ontiveros, supra note 11, at 31. 
118 See Forster, supra note 22, at 544. 
119 See Gonos, supra note 14, at 105. 
120 Jean McAllister, Sisyphus at Work in the Warehouse: Temporary Employment in Greenville, 
South Carolina, in Contingent Work, supra note 23, at 221, 235. 
121 See Davidov, supra note 39, at 381; Summers, supra note 10, at 510. 
122 See Stone, supra note 14, at 68. 
123 See Carré, supra note 17, at 5. Similarly, job instability impacts all contingent work-
ers. See Belous, supra note 36, at 865; Forster, supra note 22, at 547; see also Ontiveros, supra 
note 11, at 29 (noting that contingent workers do not have an ongoing expectation that 
their work will continue). 
124 See Ontiveros, supra note 11, at 29. 
125 See Shirley Lung, Developing a Course on the Rights of Low-Wage Workers, 54 J. Legal 
Educ. 380, 381 (2004). 
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 While four-ªfths of temporary workers work full-time,126 they re-
ceive few or no employment beneªts.127 Paid vacation, paid holidays, 
sick leave, medical insurance, and pension plans are virtually un-
known to temporary workers.128 The lack of employer-provided bene-
ªts has repercussions that affect more than just temporary workers.129 
For example, in 1997, 46.4% of temporary workers had health insur-
ance, but 39.4% of those workers received their insurance from 
somewhere other than their employers.130 That only 7% of temporary 
workers received health insurance from their employer suggests that a 
signiªcant number of workers turned to other private and public 
sources for health insurance.131 At the same time, temporary workers 
receive lower pay than other workers.132
 Given these disadvantages, many temporary and other contin-
gent workers desire a different work status.133 Most workers who use 
THFs do not do so because they prefer temporary work.134 Only 27% 
of non-student contingent workers claimed to be satisªed with their 
work arrangement.135 Similarly, only 34% of temporary workers re-
port that they prefer their work arrangement.136 Most want a perma-
nent job, but accept a temporary position because they have not been 
able to ªnd permanent employment.137 Indeed, a full two-thirds of 
temporary workers want a traditional job.138
                                                                                                                      
126 Cohany et al., supra note 37, at 64. 
127 See Summers, supra note 10, at 510. 
128 See id. 
129 See Schroeder, supra note 107, at 734–35. Schroeder notes that businesses’ failure to 
provide beneªts to temporary and part-time workers has signiªcant implications for work-
ers, particularly women, who seek to take advantage of statutory “family-friendly” policies 
such as medical leave. See id. 
130 Carré, supra note 17, at 15 tbl.1. Another commentator, citing unpublished indus-
try data, reported that 53% of temporary workers received health insurance through a 
spouse, parent, or other source. Edward A. Lenz, “Contingent Work” —Dispelling the Myth, 52 
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 755, 764 (1995); see also Schroeder, supra note 107, at 735 (stating 
that many employers of temporary workers either cannot afford to pay for health insur-
ance for their workers or simply do not want to invest in these workers). 
131 See Carré, supra note 17, at 15 tbl.1. 
132 See Lung, supra note 125, at 381; Summers, supra note 10, at 510. 
133 See Cohany et al., supra note 37, at 50; Summers, supra note 10, at 510. 
134 See Summers, supra note 10, at 510. 
135 See Cohany et al., supra note 37, at 50. 
136 Carré, supra note 17, at 4. 
137 See Summers, supra note 10, at 510. 
138 Cohany et al., supra note 37, at 64. 
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F. Women and People of Color in the Temporary Workforce 
 Women and people of color hold a disproportionate percentage of 
the rapidly increasing number of jobs available in the THI and contin-
gent workforce.139 Women are overrepresented in the THI as com-
pared to their share of the total workforce.140 While women repre-
sented 46% of total employment they comprised 55% of temporary 
workers.141 Similarly, people of color are overrepresented in relation to 
their percentage of the nation’s total population.142 In 1995, while be-
tween 2.2% and 4.9% of the total employed in the nation were contin-
gent workers, between 13.3% and 13.9% of black workers performed 
contingent work and between 11.3% and 13.6% of Latino workers per-
formed contingent work.143
 The use of THFs relocates work out of core labor markets and 
into secondary markets where workers earn less money and experi-
ence greater job instability.144 In 1995, temporary workers on average 
earned $1.30 per hour less than regular full-time workers.145 Earnings 
differentials are most devastating for people of color and women.146 
While the median earnings of temporary workers working full-time 
was $290 per week, Latinos working full-time as temporary workers 
could only count on a median weekly wage of $237 per week.147 Simi-
larly, the average hourly wage for male temporary workers was $9.19, 
while female temporary workers on average earned only $8.94 per 
hour, a difference of several hundred dollars per year.148 Due to the 
disproportionate representation of people of color in the THI, the 
earnings differential “translates into ethnic-based earnings inequal-
                                                                                                                      
139 See Summers, supra note 10, at 510; see also Dau-Schmidt, supra note 15, at 880 (not-
ing that contingent workers are disproportionately female and African-American); Polivka 
et al., supra note 16, at 47 (identifying an overrepresentation of women and black workers 
in the THI). 
140 Carré, supra note 17, at 2. 
141 Id. 
142 See Cohany et al., supra note 37, at 48 tbl.2.2. In 1995, 12% of the total population 
was black and 10.3% was Latino. See U.S. Census Bureau, 1996 Statistical Abstract of 
the United States 22 tbl.22 (1996), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2/gen/ 
96statab/pop.pdf. 
143 See Cohany et al., supra note 37, at 45, 46, 48 tbl.2.2. 
144 See Annette Bernhardt & Dave E. Marcotte, Is “Standard Employment” Still What It 
Used to Be?, in Nonstandard Work, supra note 16, at 21, 23; Gonos, supra note 14, at 86–
87; see also Polivka et al., supra note 16, at 73 (explaining that temporary workers “fairly 
uniformly earned less than regular full-time workers”). 
145 Polivka et al., supra note 16, at 75. 
146 See Cohany et al., supra note 37, at 60 tbl.2.12; Carré, supra note 17, at 5. 
147 See Cohany et al., supra note 37, at 64, 60 tbl.2.12. 
148 See Carré, supra note 17, at 5. 
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ity.”149 In addition, black workers have experienced the largest in-
crease in job instability of all workers since the 1970s.150
II. OSHA’s Applicability to Temporary Workers 
 Given the THI’s rapid growth, the overrepresentation of women 
and people of color in the THI, and the signiªcant consequences of 
temporary work, it is important to examine how the contemporary ap-
plication of OSHA uniquely impacts temporary workers.151
A. Understanding OSHA 
 OSHA’s objective is “to assure so far as possible every working man 
and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions.”152 
Similarly, federal regulations state that OSHA’s purpose is “to regulate 
employment conditions relating to occupational safety and health and 
to achieve safer and healthier workplaces throughout the Nation.”153
 Although courts generally interpret OSHA’s main purpose as mak-
ing workplaces safe from work-related hazards, courts differ in the 
amount of safety required.154 For instance, according to the Iowa Su-
preme Court, OSHA “intended to prevent the ªrst injury, including 
those of a non-serious nature.”155 The Colorado Supreme Court quali-
ªed this goal, writing that OSHA did not mandate “absolutely risk-free 
workplaces.”156 The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit agreed.157 In 
Irving v. United States, the court wrote that OSHA aims for a “satisfactory 
standard of safety,” rather than a “guarantee [of] absolute safety.”158
 Regardless of which standard for protection courts use, OSHA 
charges the Secretary of Labor with creating and enforcing the ex-
plicit statutory safety requirements that exist under OSHA.159 For ex-
                                                                                                                      
 
149 Reskin, supra note 17, at 198. 
150 Bernhardt & Marcotte, supra note 144, at 23. 
151 See Lung, supra note 125, at 391 (arguing that it is important to “critically examine 
law from a distinctly workers’ perspective”). 
152 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (2000). 
153 29 C.F.R. § 1977.1(a) (2005). 
154 See Universal Constr. Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 182 F.3d 
726, 730 (10th Cir. 1999); Clarkson Constr. Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review 
Comm’n, 531 F.2d 451, 458 (10th Cir. 1976). 
155 Union Pac. R.R. v. Johnson, 264 N.W.2d 796, 799 (Iowa 1978). 
156 See Canape v. Petersen, 897 P.2d 762, 764 (Colo. 1995). 
157 See Irving v. United States, 162 F.3d 154, 168 (1st Cir. 1998). 
158 Id. 
159 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(3) (2000). The text of the statute is as follows: “The Congress 
. . . authoriz[es] the Secretary of Labor to set mandatory occupational safety and health 
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ample, the Secretary issued regulations requiring clean and dry 
workplaces, access to potable water and toilets, and the development 
of emergency action and ªre preventions plans.160 The Act empowers 
the Secretary to cite employers for violations of OSHA standards.161 
The Act also creates a hierarchy of civil penalties that can be issued to 
an employer that violates a standard.162 To determine the penalty for 
a workplace safety standard violation, OSHA distinguishes among will-
ful or repeated violations, serious violations, not serious violations, 
failures to correct a violation, and willful violations that result in the 
death of an employee.163 Firms that are cited can contest the citation 
by turning to the OSHRC to adjudicate disagreements.164
 OSHA places a burden on both employers and employees to ad-
here to its workplace safety standards.165 The Act encourages employ-
ers and employees “to become aware of, and warn against, possible 
hazards.”166 The statutory text indicates that employees have separate 
but dependent responsibilities for maintaining safe and healthful 
working conditions from those imposed on employers.167 Speciªcally, 
employees are obligated to comply with all of OSHA’s rules and regu-
                                                                                                                      
standards applicable to businesses affecting interstate commerce, and . . . creat[e] an Oc-
cupational Safety and Health Review Commission for carrying out adjudicatory functions 
. . . .” Id. OSHA standards apply to employment performed anywhere in the USA unless 
the type of work is expressly governed by a federal agency other than the Department of 
Labor. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.5(a)–(b) (2006). 
160 29 C.F.R. § 1910.141; see 29 C.F.R. §§ 1910.38(a), 1910.39. 
161 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(3); Indus. Union Dep’t. v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 470 (D.C. Cir. 
1974); Farrah-Marisa Chua Short, Comments, An Experiment in Protecting Workers’ Rights: The 
Garment Industry of the U.S. Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, 7 U. Pa. J. Lab. & 
Emp. L. 971, 987 (2005). 
162 Short, supra note 161, at 987. The statute allows the Secretary to issue ªnes ranging 
from $1000 for giving advance notice of a workplace inspection to no less than $5000 and 
no more than $70,000 for willfully or repeatedly violating an OSHA requirement. See 29 
U.S.C. § 666(a), (e). 
163 29 U.S.C. § 666(a)–(e). 
164 See id. § 651(b)(3). The OSHRC is composed of three members appointed by the 
President for six-year terms. Id. § 661(a)–(b). The OSHRC’s chairperson appoints admin-
istrative law judges who are charged with resolving disputes concerning alleged OSHA 
violations. Id. § 661(j). Any OSHRC decision is subject to judicial review in any federal 
court of appeals or, in special circumstances, the Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia. Id. § 660(a). A reviewing court must give great deference to the OSHRC’s inter-
pretation of OSHA regulations. See Concrete Constr. Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health 
Review Comm’n, 598 F.2d 1031, 1033 (6th Cir. 1979). 
165 See 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(2); cf. Irving v. United States, 162 F.3d 154, 169 (1st Cir. 
1998) (declaring that responsibility for workplace safety does not fall on the federal gov-
ernment). 
166 Carnevale et al., supra note 23, at 281; see 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(1), (2). 
167 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(2). 
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lations.168 For their part, employers are required to provide a hazard-
free workplace.169
B. Employment-Status Tests 
 On its face, it would appear that OSHA protects all workers identi-
cally.170 However, the statute’s explicit goal of providing “every working 
man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions” 
stands in stark contrast to the interpretation that limits OSHA protec-
tions only to those workers found to be “employees” of the OSHA viola-
tor.171
 The importance of temporary workers’ legal characterization as 
“employer” and “employee” cannot be overstated because most work-
place safety protections are only afforded to those workers statutorily 
deªned as “employees.”172 Indeed, the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia determined that “OSHA . . . covers every employer 
whose business affects interstate commerce,” but qualiªed this state-
ment by noting, “the protection of the health of employees is the over-
riding concern of OSHA.”173 Implicitly, the court’s determination that 
OSHA covers only “employers” and seeks to protect “employees” lim-
its OSHA’s applicability to instances in which an employment rela-
tionship exists.174 Moreover, OSHA deªnes an “employer” as a “per-
                                                                                                                      
168 See 29 U.S.C. § 654(b); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1910.177(g)(8) (2006) (requiring em-
ployees to stay out of the trajectory of a tire when inºating a tire that is on a single piece 
rim wheel). 
169 See 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1); Indus. Union Dep’t. v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 470 (D.C. 
Cir. 1974); see also Irving, 162 F.3d at 169 (determining that OSHA “in no uncertain terms, 
places primary responsibility for workplace safety on employers”); Canape v. Colo. Comp. 
Ins. Auth., 897 P.2d 762, 764 (Colo. 1995) (determining that OSHA imposes a general 
obligation upon employers to provide safe working conditions). 
170 See Clarkson Constr. Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 531 F.2d 
451, 457 (10th Cir. 1976) (determining that OSHA applies to “all persons working on the 
premises”). 
171 29 U.S.C. § 651(b); see Carnevale et al., supra note 23, at 297; see also Dau-Schmidt, su-
pra note 15, at 883 (arguing that it is of little use to a temporary worker if she is an employee 
of a ªrm that is not responsible for ensuring safe working conditions at the site to which she 
is assigned). In addition, user ªrms that contract with THFs often contest the characteriza-
tion of an employment relationship to avoid being recognized as a temporary worker’s “em-
ployer.” See Froedtert II, No. 97–1839, 2004 WL 2308763, at *4 (O.S.H.R.C. Jan. 15, 2004); Sec’y 
of Labor v. Froedtert Mem’l Lutheran Hosp. (Froedtert I ), No. 97–1839, 1999 WL 503823, at 
*2 (O.S.H.R.C.A.L.J. July 1, 1999); Sec’y of Labor v. S. Scrap Materials Co., No. 94–3393, 1997 
WL 735352, at *6, *11 (O.S.H.R.C.A.L.J. Nov. 24, 1997). 
172 See Carnevale et al., supra note 23, at 281; Summers, supra note 10, at 511. 
173 Hodgson, 499 F.2d at 470, 475 (emphasis added). 
174 See id. at 470. 
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son engaged in a business affecting commerce who has employees.”175 
It goes on to deªne “employees” as “an employee of an employer who 
is employed in a business of his employer which affects commerce.”176 
These circular deªnitions are, to say the least, uninformative and 
leave much of the task of determining when OSHA applies to judicial 
interpretation.177
 Given the importance of the deªnition of “employee” and “em-
ployer,” an analysis of OSHA’s practical application to temporary 
workers must examine the four tests that courts created and histori-
cally have relied upon to determine employment status for purposes 
of labor and employment laws.178 Initially, courts relied on a test that 
utilized the common law of agency.179 Later, this test gave way to an 
analysis called the economic realities test.180 Yet another test, the hy-
brid test, essentially combined the common law and economic reali-
ties tests.181 Most recently, the Supreme Court developed the Darden 
test.182 A brief examination of each of these tests shows that many op-
portunities remain for employers to avoid liability.183
 The common law test, rooted in the Restatement (Second) of Agency, 
stands out as the most restrictive of the four status tests.184 It focuses 
largely on the putative employer’s right to control the “servant’s” 
workplace activities.185 The Restatement deªnes “servant” as “a person 
employed to perform services in the affairs of another and who . . . is 
subject to the other’s control or right to control.”186 Therefore, under 
the common law test, an employment relationship exists only when a 
user ªrm maintains control over the worker’s detailed physical per-
formance, rather than merely overseeing a worker’s activities.187 Since 
                                                                                                                      
 
175 29 U.S.C. § 652(5). 
176 29 U.S.C. § 652(6). 
177 See Brennan v. Gilles & Cotting, Inc., 504 F.2d 1255, 1260 (4th Cir. 1974). 
178 See Indus. Union Dep’t. v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Befort, su-
pra note 13, at 417–19. 
179 Befort, supra note 13, at 417. 
180 See id. at 417–19; Dau-Schmidt, supra note 15, at 884. 
181 See Befort, supra note 13, at 418. 
182 Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992). 
183 See Befort, supra note 10, at 163. 
184 See id. at 166. 
185 See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220(1) (1958); see also id. § 220(2) (listing 
factors to be considered in addition to control); id. § 220 cmt. a (emphasizing the control 
of a putative employee’s physical movements). 
186 Id. § 220(1) (1958). 
187 See Leone v. U.S., 910 F.2d 46, 50 (2nd Cir. 1990); see also Schwieger v. Farm Bureau 
Ins. Co., 207 F.3d 480, 484–85 (8th Cir. 2000) (determining that a worker was not a com-
pany’s employee even though the worker submitted regular production reports to a com-
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control is the key factor in determining whether a worker is an “em-
ployee,” a user ªrm is able to avoid “employer” status by mitigating its 
interaction with the worker.188
 The economic realities test takes a more expansive interpretive 
approach to employment status than advanced by the common law 
test.189 As initially conceptualized by the Supreme Court, the test in-
cluded workers who were employees “as a matter of economic reality” 
within the deªnition of “employee.”190 Originally developed under 
the Social Security Act and expanded to apply to claims lodged under 
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), the economic realities test em-
phasized the workers’ dependence for their livelihood on the putative 
employer under various statutes governing working conditions.191 
Over time, courts began to consider such factors as whether the puta-
tive employer had the power to hire and ªre temporary workers, su-
pervise and control conditions of employment and employee work 
schedules, determine the rate and method of payment, and maintain 
employment records.192 As the test is now utilized, the worker’s de-
pendence on the ªrm is the most important factor in the analysis.193
 The hybrid test, in essence, embodies a combination of the 
common law and economic realities tests.194 Though it examines the 
                                                                                                                      
pany manager who had the power to reassign her accounts to other workers; was evaluated 
on her proªtability, dress, and attitude; was expected to notify her manager of vacations; 
and was required to seek the company’s approval for any advertising she chose to con-
duct). 
188 Cf. U.S. v. New England Coal & Coke Co., 318 F.2d 138, 142 (1st Cir. 1963) (explic-
itly rejecting, under the common law test, the proposition that a federal workplace statute 
that governed “all persons employed by” a company included every worker that the com-
pany relied on to complete its work). 
189 Compare Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220 cmt. a (1958) (explicitly stating 
the common law test’s emphasis on control of a putative employee’s physical movements), 
with Usery v. Pilgrim Equip. Co., 527 F.2d 1308, 1311 (5th Cir. 1976) (using the economic 
realities test, the Court examined a worker’s dependence on a ªrm, in addition to control 
and other factors, to determine the worker’s employment status). Notably, a recent presi-
dential commission recommended adoption of the economic realities test for determining 
employment status across all federal statutes. Befort, supra note 10, at 172. 
190 See United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 713 (1947). 
191 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2000); Social Se-
curity Act, 42 U.S.C. § 301 (2000). See generally Lilley v. BTM Corp., 958 F.2d 746, 750 (6th 
Cir. 1992) (emphasizing economic dependence in the context of the Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act); Usery, 527 F.2d at 1311 (emphasizing dependence in the context of 
the FLSA). 
192 See Preston v. Settle Down Enters., 90 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1274 (N.D. Ga. 2000). 
193 See Lilley, 958 F.2d at 750; see also Usery, 527 F.2d at 1311 (“It is dependence that indi-
cates employee status.”). 
194 See Ontiveros, supra note 11, at 669. 
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economic realities of the employment relationship, the hybrid test, 
like the common law, particularly emphasizes the putative employer’s 
right to control the means and manner of the worker’s perform-
ance.195 Several federal courts adopted the hybrid test in the 1970s 
and 1980s to effectuate congressional intent in enacting legislation.196
 The most recent of the commonly used tests for determining 
employment status is the Darden test, named after the 1992 Supreme 
Court decision in which it was announced.197 In that case, after exam-
ining an independent insurance agent’s claim that he was an em-
ployee of a nationwide insurance company, the Court found that the 
economic realities test was a “feeble,” circular, and unpredictable de-
terminant of employment status.198 As a result, it promulgated a thir-
teen-factor reformulation of the traditional common law test.199 The 
Court instructed that employment status should take into account the 
putative employer’s right to control the manner and means of the 
work; the skill required to perform the work; the source of the in-
strumentalities and tools used to perform the work; the actual, physi-
cal location of the work; the duration of the relationship between the 
parties; whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional 
projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired party’s discretion 
over when and how long to work; the method of payment; the hired 
party’s role in hiring and paying; whether the work is part of the hir-
ing party’s regular business; whether the hiring party is actually in 
business; the provision of employee beneªts; and the tax treatment of 
the hired party.200 While no one factor is decisive, the Court empha-
sized the putative employer’s right to control the manner and means 
of the work.201
                                                                                                                      
195 See Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826, 831 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Befort, supra note 10, 
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199 See Befort, supra note 10, at 167. 
200 Darden, 503 U.S. at 323. 
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§ 220(1), (2) (1958). 
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 The various status tests afford employers many legal loopholes 
through which they can jump to avoid liability for workplace safety 
conditions.202 When disputes under OSHA emphasize the extent to 
which the putative employer controls the worker, the user ªrm can 
avoid liability merely by distancing itself sufªciently from the THF’s 
operations and the temporary workers’ performance.203 In effect, the 
Darden test’s emphasis on the right to control incentivizes employer 
efforts to circumvent existing employment regulations.204 Darden’s 
narrow emphasis on the right to control invites “adroit schemes . . . to 
avoid the immediate burdens at the expense of the beneªts sought by 
the legislation.”205 For example, an attorney for user ªrms who “has 
warned against supervising temps [sic] too closely or letting them at-
tend general staff meetings,” advised clients not to request or reject 
any temporary worker by name, and not to attempt to resolve prob-
lems that arise in the course of a temporary worker’s performance.206 
Meanwhile, legal liability rests upon THFs even though they are not 
required to ensure that the user ªrms to which they send workers 
comply with OSHA’s safety standards.207
III. Improving OSHA’s Protection of Temporary Workers 
 OSHA remains the principal federal legislation governing work-
place conditions.208 Therefore, all workers, whether temporary, con-
tingent, or core, need OSHA’s protections if the nation’s workplaces 
are to be held to a meaningful and consistent standard of safety and 
health.209 Temporary workers deserve particular attention because 
the nature of temporary work is such that their employment limits the 
long-term interest that user ªrms have in the workers’ health and 
safety.210
                                                                                                                      
202 See Befort, supra note 10, at 163. 
203 See Middleton, supra note 27, at 582. 
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208 See 29 U.S.C. § 651 (2000). 
209 See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 15, at 882. 
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 Expressly and unambiguously extending OSHA to include tem-
porary workers would not come without costs.211 The existence of a 
regulatory hierarchy in which core workers receive more workplace 
safety protection than temporary workers makes temporary workers 
less expensive than core workers.212 As a result, federal legislation ef-
fectively creates an artiªcial cost savings incentive to use temporary 
workers by indirectly subsidizing the ªnancial cost of satisfying legal 
obligations.213 However, the goal of modern labor policy, as evidenced 
by OSHA’s protection of workers and the NLRA’s guarantee of work-
ers’ right to unionize, is not to maximize employer proªts.214 Rather, 
the goal of modern labor policy is to strike a balance of proªts and 
worker protections.215 Consequently, labor laws should be crafted to 
avoid the “race to the bottom”216 with regard to workplace safety pro-
tections for temporary workers that results from Darden’s easily ma-
nipulable employment status test.217
 Developing an expanded and simpliªed OSHA coverage scheme is 
feasible.218 Moreover, a uniform interpretation of employment status is 
an essential step to improving OSHA’s effectiveness, enhancing cer-
tainty regarding perceptions of the type of employment relationship 
that exists, and reducing litigation.219 The premise of a reformulated 
coverage scheme should be that OSHA’s obligations extend to include 
everyone who performs work at a place of employment regardless of 
the employment relationship that exists between the worker and the 
business owner.220
 Various non-judicial options exist to expand and simplify OSHA 
coverage.221 Directly revising the statutory deªnition of “employee” 
                                                                                                                      
211 See Befort, supra note 13, at 422; Dau-Schmidt, supra note 15, at 882. 
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187, 188 (1999). 
217 See Befort, supra note 13, at 422. 
218 See supra notes 212–13 and accompanying text. 
219 See Brennan v. Gilles & Cotting, Inc., 504 F.2d 1255, 1261 (4th Cir. 1974); Linder, 
supra note 216, at 221. 
220 See Linder, supra note 216, at 224. 
221 See Françoise Carré & Pamela Joshi, Looking for Leverage in a Fluid World: Innovative 
Responses to Temporary and Contracted Work, in Nonstandard Work, supra note 16, at 313, 
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and “employer” to expressly include temporary workers and THFs 
would most broaden the employment-status criteria.222 Direct revision 
of the OSHA deªnitions would have the beneªt of covering the larg-
est number of workers; removing user ªrm incentives to avoid em-
ployer classiªcation, thereby evading legal obligations and their re-
sulting ªnancial costs; and reducing the litigation waged to determine 
whether an employer-employee relationship exists.223 However, reli-
ance on statutory revision does not seem viable; congressional efforts 
to explicitly protect temporary workers have, to date, been unsuccess-
ful.224 As a result, legislative reforms remain “far from imminent.”225
 Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have also increased 
OSHA protections for temporary workers.226 In particular, labor un-
ions have protected contingent workers through collective bargaining 
agreements and by creating employment centers, branches of a union 
that essentially operate as THFs in that they provide unionized tem-
porary workers to user ªrms.227 Non-union NGOs have also attempted 
to protect temporary workers, especially through the formation of 
independent workers’ centers.228 In spite of these efforts, in practice, 
temporary workers remain unprotected by OSHA.229
 Lacking viable non-judicial alternatives, a clearly deªned judicial 
interpretation remains an important route to expanded OSHA protec-
tion of temporary workers.230 Judicial challenges to current interpreta-
tions of OSHA are necessary to address the existing presumption that 
THFs are the legally recognized employer of temporary workers.231 
Recognizing that the deªnition of “employer” and “employee” are “so-
cially constructed—deªned and shaped over time by social, legal, and 
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political forces” indicates that these deªnitions can be judicially inter-
preted to protect temporary workers under OSHA.232
A. Current State of Employee-Status Interpretation 
 Since OSHA does not explicitly address the situation of workers 
in temporary arrangements, the OSHRC adopted the economic reali-
ties test to examine the real-world relationship that exists between 
workers and ªrms.233 The OSHRC’s adoption of the economic reali-
ties test represented an administrative attempt to expand OSHA’s 
purview beyond circumstances covered by the common law.234
 In 1992, however, the Supreme Court clearly signaled that the 
OSHRC’s attempt had failed.235 In Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. 
Darden, the Supreme Court rejected the economic realities test as it 
evolved under the FLSA for purposes other than FLSA analyses.236 In a 
claim brought by an insurance agent against an insurance company, the 
Court sought to determine what constitutes an “employee” under the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974.237 ERISA 
deªned “employee” as “any individual employed by an employer.”238 
According to the Court, this statutory deªnition was “completely circu-
lar and explains nothing.”239 The Court determined that, unless the 
statute explicitly speciªed otherwise, Congress intended “employee” to 
be deªned in accordance with the reformulation of the common law of 
agency test that it set forth.240 Implying that the economic realities test 
in the ERISA context led to absurd determinations of employment 
status, the Court remarked that the common law of agency test would 
not “thwart the congressional design to lead to absurd results.”241
                                                                                                                      
232 See id. at 82. 
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 The Court relied on a key distinction between the deªnition of 
“employee” found in ERISA and the FLSA.242 The Court stated that 
the FLSA deªnition is broader than that found in ERISA.243 Congress, 
the Court deduced, intended for the FLSA to include some workers 
who might not qualify as “employees” under agency law principals.244 
As a result, outside a speciªc FLSA context, the economic realities test 
was replaced by a return to the common law of agency analysis.245
 By returning to the common law analysis, Darden rendered the 
statutory purpose of all federal workplace regulations, except the 
FLSA, irrelevant, while elevating the common law’s emphasis on con-
trol of a worker’s daily workplace activities to that of a major consid-
eration in the employment status calculus.246 Today, fourteen years 
after Darden, the Court’s emphasis on control ostensibly functions as a 
“principal guidepost” of statutory interpretation for the OSHRC.247 
Absent an express statutory direction to do otherwise,248 courts are to 
turn to the principals articulated in the Restatement (Second) of Agency 
which emphasize the extent of the control that the “master” may ex-
ercise over the work details.249
B. Conºict Within the OSHRC 
 While the contemporary OSHRC has clearly stated that Darden 
guides its determinations of employment status, Commission decisions 
reached since Darden sometimes use Darden’s reformulated common 
law test and at other times use the economic realities tests.250 For ex-
ample, in Secretary of Labor v. Froedtert Memorial Lutheran Hospital (Froed-
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tert I ), a 1999 decision involving a Wisconsin hospital cited for allegedly 
violating reporting standards for worker injuries, the OSHRC explicitly 
determined that employment status should be interpreted under 
common law principals.251 The hospital challenged the citation claim-
ing it was improper because the alleged violation concerned temporary 
workers rather than legal employees.252 There was no dispute that the 
workers were acquired through two THFs.253 In applying the common 
law principals, the Commission’s analysis emphasized that an employer 
is one “who has control over the work environment such that abate-
ment of hazards can be obtained.”254 The OSHRC took into account 
that the hospital supplied protective equipment, uniforms, tools, and 
supplies to the temporary workers, in addition to controlling their day-
to-day activities.255 It also considered that the temporary workers per-
formed all their work on the hospital’s premises.256 In the end, the 
Commission determined that the hospital was in control of the work-
place, therefore it was responsible for complying with OSHA with re-
gard to the temporary workers.257
 Five years later, the OSHRC reiterated the common law princi-
pals when the same hospital again challenged a determination that 
temporary workers were employees under the common law.258 The 
hospital admitted to controlling the on-site activities performed by 
the temporary workers, as the OSHRC found in Froedtert I, but argued 
that “its lack of authority to hire, ªre, discipline and pay precluded it 
from being the temps’ employer.”259 Using the common law test, the 
Commission took into account that the hospital was able to request 
that the THF replace or remove a particular temporary worker.260 
Though the OSHRC acknowledged that the hospital “did not directly 
control all aspects” of the temporary workers’ assignment or working 
conditions, it found that, for purposes of OSHA, the workers were 
employees of the hospital.261
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 Yet in a separate case, Secretary of Labor v. Southern Scrap Materials 
Co., decided after Darden, the OSHRC elected not to use the Darden 
analysis; instead, it relied on the economic realities test that Darden 
seemingly overruled for OSHA purposes.262 In this case, a Louisiana 
scrap metal processing plant was cited for several OSHA violations.263 
The plant contended that the “affected employee” referred to in the 
citation was employed by a THF rather than by the plant.264 As part of 
its economic realities test consideration, the Commission took into 
account the worker’s perception of who constituted his employer; 
whether the plant had the power or responsibility to control the 
worker, including the power to ªre, hire or modify the worker’s em-
ployment conditions; whether the worker’s ability to increase his wage 
depended on efªciency rather than initiative, judgment, or foresight; 
and how the worker’s wages were established.265 The “key factor,” the 
Commission determined, was “the right to control the work.”266 The 
OSHRC then considered that the plant assigned the worker to the 
job; provided training; set work hours; provided tools or equipment, 
including safety equipment; supervised the work; controlled the work-
ing conditions; and paid the THF for the worker’s service.267 The 
Commission found that the temporary worker was indeed the plant’s 
employee under OSHA.268
 The plant presented a separate challenge to the citation based on 
its relationship to temporary workers provided by a separate THF.269 
The THF, an independent contractor, provided temporary workers 
hired to torch cut scrap metal on the plant’s property.270 The THF 
had an on-site supervisor; paid the workers an hourly wage; furnished 
the workers with rented housing; provided all equipment; was paid by 
the plant by the ton of scrap metal that was torch cut; was in the busi-
ness of providing torch cutting services to scrap yards; was responsible 
for hiring, ªring, and paying workers their wages; and set working 
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conditions.271 For its part, the plant provided workers with respirators 
and some safety training, and had the power to stop work if the work 
was unsatisfactory or unsafe.272 The Commission determined that 
temporary workers provided by this THF were not employees of the 
plant because the plant did not exercise sufªcient control over the 
work they performed.273
 Scrap Materials and the Froedtert decisions illustrate the manipula-
bility inherent in the existing employment-status tests.274 Indeed, nei-
ther the economic realities nor Darden tests provide an employment-
status interpretation any more informative or predictable than the 
criteria previously criticized by courts.275 On the contrary, these cases 
illustrate the ambiguous nature of the status tests by leaving open the 
question of how much control a user ªrm must wield over a tempo-
rary worker in order to be legally classiªed as her employer for pur-
poses of OSHA liability.276 Statutory ambiguity merely reinforces the 
democratic deªcit that exists between temporary workers and THFs 
because many temporary workers are low-skilled laborers who have 
little bargaining power in comparison to user ªrms.277
C. Adopting a Purposive Interpretation 
 To resolve statutory ambiguity in applying OSHA, the Act should 
be interpreted so as to fulªll “the objectives Congress sought to 
achieve through this legislation” by applying a purposive approach.278 
A purposive approach ensures that the statute’s goals are achieved, 
rather than merely applied formalistically or mechanically.279 Use of a 
purposive approach requires measurement of the success of interpre-
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tations of employment status by the degree to which they effectuate 
Congress’s intent to protect all workers.280
 Interpreting OSHA purposively is particularly appropriate be-
cause of the statute’s textual explanation of its goals.281 In devising the 
Act, Congress embedded in the statutory text its motivations in enact-
ing the law and its intended goal: “The Congress ªnds that personal 
injuries and illnesses arising out of work situations impose a substan-
tial burden upon, and are a hindrance to, interstate commerce in 
terms of lost production, wage loss, medical expenses, and disability 
compensation payments.”282 Importantly, the stated purpose identiªes 
“personal injuries and illnesses arising out of work situations” as the 
problem that OSHA is intended to rectify.283 Congress did not state 
nor even suggest that “personal injuries and illnesses arising out of 
work situations” were only detrimental to the nation’s economy when 
they occurred to particular types of workers.284 On the contrary, the 
statute clearly expresses a congressional ªnding that such injuries and 
illnesses are economically detrimental whenever they occur because 
they adversely impact interstate commerce.285 Furthermore, while the 
Senate explicitly addressed injuries and illnesses prevalent in various 
industries, it did not discuss the employment status of the injured or 
ill workers it intended OSHA to cover.286 The only limitation included 
within the statutory purpose is that the injury or illness must arise 
from engagement in a “work situation.”287 Consequently, all individu-
als who are injured or become ill from a work situation fall within the 
purview of the statute’s purpose as contemplated by the Senate and 
explicitly stated in its text.288
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 In contrast to their narrow interpretation of employee status, 
courts have historically applied OSHA’s provisions in accordance with 
the statute’s broad purpose.289 In 1999, the Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit decided that OSHA “must be liberally construed” so as 
to effectuate its remedial purposes.290 Prior to Darden, the Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit found that OSHA’s “keystone” is “pre-
ventability” of workplace injuries or illnesses without regard to the 
employment status of the injured or ill worker.291 Similarly, the 
OSHRC stated that OSHA’s “design” is the “improvement of working 
conditions and the well-being of employees.”292 Notably, the OSHRC 
did not specify that working conditions should only improve for em-
ployees of the ªrm responsible for creating or controlling the condi-
tions.293
 A purposive interpretation of OSHA would reduce manipulabil-
ity, protect workers regardless of employment status, and effectuate 
the congressional purpose.294 Moreover, a purposive application of 
OSHA would expand the scope of the employment relationship so as 
to prevent employer manipulation of the appearances of control to 
avoid legal liability.295 Such an interpretation would reverse the cur-
rent course of anti-purposive interpretation that results in exposure of 
growing segments of the working population to the “unshielded rig-
ors of the labor market.”296 It is important to recognize that the 
Court’s decision in Darden to revitalize the common law principals did 
not erase OSHA’s remedial nature.297
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Conclusion 
 This Note has explored the intersection of OSHA, the nation’s 
premier federal statute governing working conditions, and temporary 
workers.298 In the last thirty years, the THI has become entrenched in 
the USA’s labor landscape.299 Today, THFs disproportionately employ 
women and people of color who are paid less than other workers.300 
Through prolonged legislative lobbying by the THI and key judicial 
interpretations, contemporary jurisprudence facilitates the THI’s grow-
ing presence in the labor market.301 Namely, by adopting a triangular 
employment relationship, contemporary legal practice artiªcially in-
centivizes the use of temporary workers.302 As such, temporary workers 
operate outside the realm of regulatory protections where they repre-
sent less expensive labor options.303
 The Darden analysis, as post-Darden OSHRC decisions indicate, 
leaves temporary workers laboring without a consistent and clearly 
deªnable interpretation of employment status.304 Darden’s greatest 
risk to temporary workers is that they will be recognized as “employ-
ees” under OSHA, but only as employees of a THF and not the user 
ªrm.305 Since THFs are not liable for the workplace safety conditions 
at the sites to which they assign temporary workers, workers are effec-
tively left without workplace safety protections.306 Such an approach 
realizes the Tenth Circuit’s fear that “in restricting the work area in 
some artiªcial manner . . . the employer escapes responsibility for 
protecting an area [where people work].”307
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 It is therefore necessary to reconceptualize the modern interpre-
tation of employment status to fully effectuate the congressional pur-
pose for enacting OSHA.308 The statute simply does not envision a 
hierarchy of workplace protections determined by employment 
status.309 Consequently, neither should courts.310
 The rapid growth of the temporary workforce requires a reex-
amination of OSHA’s workplace safety and health protections.311 As 
an increasing number of the USA’s workers ªnd themselves laboring 
in the volatile temporary workforce, it is necessary for policymakers to 
strike a socially sanctioned balance of proªts and workers’ protec-
tions.312 To embrace OSHA’s goal of “assur[ing] so far as possible 
every working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working 
conditions,” OSHA must occupy a prominent role in the regulation of 
working conditions for temporary workers.313
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